prove that any fellow-man is consciously active when he replies intelligently to some question. The essential question at issue may be stated as follows. Pavlov, in his earlier descriptions and discussions of these experiments, suggested that such acquisition of a 'conditioned reflex' is the prototype of all learning, of all profiting by experience; that the dog's native capacity for action consists in a bundle of separate reflexes; and that all his feats of learning, all his manifestations of intelligent profiting by experience, are nothing other than the mechanical acquisition of mechanical complications of such reflexes.

To all those who had committed themselves to the proposition that man is a machine and nothing more, and who were hungrily awaiting some experimental facts that might seem to give this proposition some vestige of support, Pavlov's suggestions were very welcome; they were the culmination of reflexology, of which American behaviourism was a derivative. But it was soon made obvious that this attempt to identify intelligent activity with conditioned reflexes was fallacious; that, apart from all conditioning, animals, even animals much lower in the scale of intelligence than the dog, have a power of adapting their instinctive (or innately provided) modes of behaviour to special circumstances, in such ways as enable them to attain their natural goals in spite of those unusual circumstances; that the acquisition of the miscalled conditioned reflex is only one, and that the least intelligent, of various forms of adaptive

process effected through the brain.

And now, twenty years out of date, comes Prof. Hogben to proclaim once more the exploded falkcies of behaviourism as of * supreme philosophical importance '.